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Introduction  
 
Towards the end of the Vietnam War, Leslie Gelb published a damning 
insider’s view of the way the United States had judiciously created a faulty 
foreign policy towards Vietnam. His 1971 analysis brought to bear a terse 
view of how American policy toward French Indochina developed over 
several decades.1 This policy centered on symbolism, minimal 
involvement, and an austere strategy that public opinion tempered.  
 
Current American policy in the greater Middle East region appears to be 
no different on three similar points: Symbolic pursuit of globally defeating 
all terrorists, waging small wars on the periphery without a fully mobilized 
commitment, and a persistent policy of fighting terrorists instead of 
dealing with the structural forces that originally created them. In these 
ungoverned (or under-governed) areas begging United States involvement 
through the years, there has been an expansion in collaborative efforts 
between the Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), 
and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This 
so-called 3D spectrum of influence (diplomacy, defense, development) 
continues to blur the lines of human and national security such that 
seemingly unrelated departments and agencies have taken to a 
collaborative effort in advancing national interests.2 Their policies and 
practices have ballooned into a quasi-interventionist model that American 
political leaders find difficult to reverse course. In short, the American 
approach to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) of the 21st century—in both 
policy and practice—bears striking resemblance to the United States 
approach to Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. These policies of minimal 
involvement have proven difficult—as described in this article—to stop the 
inertia of war, be it against Communism or terrorism. 
 
Four years after South Vietnam fell to North Vietnamese and Vietcong 
forces, Gelb converted his Foreign Policy article into a book with Richard 
Betts in 1979 titled The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Chief 
conclusions drawn from this book were that American commitments to 
contain Communism were driven by doctrinal beliefs in keeping as many 
countries free from Communism (Asia especially) as possible. The 
Johnson and Nixon Administrations, respectively, developed policies and 
strategies via political and bureaucratic bargaining, creating a foreign 
policy with blurry strategic means and ends.3 Similar processes continue 
Burke and Matisek: The Illogical Logic of American Entanglement in the Middle East
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
2 
 
to inform American entanglement in the greater Middle East, as these 
policies fail to produce intended political outcomes.4  
 
Gelb’s analysis of Vietnam symbolically fits the narrative of deepening 
American entanglement in the Middle East. The United States is 
paradoxically committed to fighting terrorism and spreading democratic 
values, while trying to maintain some façade of stability in the greater 
Middle East. Unfortunately, the clumsy pursuit of terrorists and 
insurgents undermines the stability of the region, breeding more terrorism 
and anti-American sentiment.5 For instance, an American airstrike in 
Mosul that accidentally killed almost 200 civilians does not help win over 
citizens in a region that has grown wary of America’s noble motives.6 
 
Contemporary American foreign policy appears to rest on the belief of 
maintaining Middle Eastern allies. However, these allied governments 
need to rely on patronage to govern, which undercuts domestic legitimacy 
and adds to the long-term instability of the region. The national security 
bureaucracy pursues such a foreign policy without addressing the 
corruption and weak institutions enabling grievances that fuel insurgency 
and terrorism. The United States approach also ignores pan-Arab 
grievances towards America’s near-blind support for Israel and the 
American troops stationed on holy Islamic lands. Indeed, the recent 
decision to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem only further 
provoked neighbors, polarizing audiences around the sentiment of the 
United States behaving selfishly.7 
 
The framework of Gelb’s analysis provides an excellent blueprint for 
understanding how the United States stumbled into the Middle East 
without a grand strategy. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. 
broadened a war in the Middle East through strategic dithering: Doing 
enough to avoid losing, but not committing enough to secure a victory.8 
Moreover, the idea of victory has been difficult to pinpoint in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, other than vague aspirations for democracy to thrive and some 
modicum of self-sufficiency. 
 
Symbolically, preventing the spread of communism motivated fighting in 
the Vietnam War while the international community waged the Global 
War on Terror (and subsequent tautological terms) in similar vagueness in 
hopes of stopping the spread of terrorism.9 Worse yet, much like the 
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Vietnam War, the ever-persistent American wars and attempts at nation- 
and state-building in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the region, 
indicate pursuits by decision-makers to do something. This compels the 
foreign policy machine to provide resources to the fight without 
identifying a plausible strategic outcome besides doing something and not 
losing. This is immensely at odds with Clausewitzian views on war where 
the means employed should be toward a specific end. Lastly, it shows that 
the goals and means to fight and contain violent non-state actors are 
bureaucratically preferable as an institutional form of perseverance. It is 
tough (and less glamorous) building credible regimes in the greater Middle 
East that do not cultivate environments ripe for insurgency. One only 
needs to look at the annual funding disparities any given year between the 
United States State Department ($50 billion in 2015) and Department of 
Defense ($585 billion in 2015) to see which priorities and goals are more 
salient to American leadership.10 The irony is that fighting terrorism while 
trying to tame the Middle East are both being pursued by the United 
States national security bureaucracy, but through divergent mechanisms 
that undermine each other. 
 
An Efficient Pursuit of Terrorism? 
 
United States policy towards fighting terrorists in the War on Terrorism 
(known as Overseas Contingency Operations during the Obama era (2009-
2017) with a return to War on Terror phraseology in the Trump 
administration is merely a byproduct of bureaucratic pursuits of efficiency 
coupled with the tinted ideological lenses of certain elites.11 Each American 
president since Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) has had to accept the 
fact that the Middle East is inexorably tied to American interests in the 
realm of energy security, given that these economic ties started in the 
region when an American oil company discovered oil in Saudi Arabia in 
1938.12 In context of energy security, the Dwight Eisenhower 
administration exercised this interest as the CIA (with the help of the UK) 
overthrew the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mosaddeq of Iran, due to his attempt at nationalizing the British Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company.13 The oil shocks of the 1970s illustrated the sort of 
domestic issues caused by disruptions to oil markets emanating from the 
Persian Gulf.14 Owing to this, the Jimmy Carter administration formally 
codified present and future Middle East region commitments through a 
State of the Union address in 1980:  
Burke and Matisek: The Illogical Logic of American Entanglement in the Middle East
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
4 
 
 
Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on 
the vital interests of the United States of America, and 
such an assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force.15  
 
Soon after, Carter established a small military contingent in the region, 
and only a few years later, the Ronald Reagan administration built up a 
new military command structure responsible for the Middle East region. 
Carter’s Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force later grew into U.S. Central 
Command (CENTCOM), which was supposed to deal with stability and 
security issues in a region ranging west to Egypt, south to Yemen, east to 
Pakistan and as far north as Kazakhstan.16 Consequently, a series of 
cascading events increased American military entanglement in the region, 
despite such a presence increasing local and ideological grievances. Osama 
Bin Laden specifically decried the presence of United States military forces 
near the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in 1990, later issuing a 
“Declaration of Jihad” against the United States in 1996.17 Moreover, while 
Bin Laden staged numerous attacks against the United States and her 
interests during the 1990s, the spectacle of 9/11 finally forced the hand of 
the American foreign policy establishment. This compelled American 
leadership to commit significant resources to the pursuit of al-Qaeda and 
similar groups, all while seeking regime change in non-compliant states. 
 
American involvement in the greater Middle East and the perpetual war 
against terrorism became a function of gradual American commitments 
expressed in three propositions: 
 
First, American immersion in the Middle East is not a story of a 
great nation blindly throwing itself into a morass. Instead, 
American leadership decided the Middle East was important 
because energy disruptions had domestic ramifications, while 9/11 
gave the necessary political impetus to engage in shadowy wars 
across the Middle East.18 The United States was not particularly 
concerned with the type of governments in the region, but with the 
degree to which those governments adhered to some form of the 
Washington Consensus and the free-flow of natural resources.19 
American leadership does not see the Middle East as important in 
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and of itself, and the policies of most presidential administrations 
reflect this notion. Instead, losing the region to non-capitalists is a 
perceptual trap grounded in what domestic and international 
audiences might think. Hence, decades of involvement in the region 
have made American involvement unavoidable and more 
complicated. Each administration has inherited diplomatic baggage 
that has continued to accumulate since FDR. Commitments to the 
perceived necessity of the region for economic and military 
purposes have deepened obligations to the region, which ironically, 
undermines American long-term goals. 
 
Second, the myopic pursuit of rapid military victories in Iraq and 
Afghanistan undermined the true measure of success: Political 
stability. Decisions made in both conflicts demonstrate how 
American leadership only wanted to do enough to win militarily, 
while hoping for political success with minimal resource 
commitments. A lack of strategic outlays and resources has made 
political victory in the region elusive. The battles still playing out in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya—to name a few—only further reiterate the 
harsh reality that the United States is great at winning tactically, 
but terrible at winning strategically. The inability of the United 
States and its regional allies to keep a pro-American Yemeni 
government propped up is indicative of the structural and societal 
forces preventing the United States from getting its way. 
 
Third, each presidential administration appears to have known the 
consequences of committing military forces and other assistance, 
while filtering information and selectively sharing with domestic 
audiences in hopes of maintaining support, giving the illusion of 
perseverance. The worst aspect of this component is that American 
leadership appears to know that their proposed strategies will not 
result in victory, but know that the sort of policies needed to win do 
not seem sellable to the American public. Therefore, instead of 
committing what is required or completely disengaging, national 
security elites create a middle-road policy. This results in an over-
reliance on technology and limited numbers of specialized ground 
forces to fight low-risk wars.20 
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Ends: “Freedom will be defended” 
 
Each administration that committed resources to the Middle East did so 
with open eyes and intent, all with unwavering commitment and will for 
success. Unlike what Andrew Bacevich suggested about the Carter 
Doctrine in 1980 as a turning point for American foreign policy, each 
successive administration from FDR to Carter to George W. Bush and 
Barack Obama knew and understood the consequences of involvement in 
the Middle East for energy security purposes.21 Along the way, each 
administrations’ decision was path dependent, forcing the United States 
down a narrower path of policy options in the Middle East, with American 
leadership touting democratic principles, while simultaneously supporting 
some of the least free regimes in the world.22 In many ways, it was more 
desirable to create compliant regimes rather than legitimate governments. 
 
Within hours of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City and 
Washington, President George W. Bush proclaimed, “freedom itself was 
attacked this morning by a faceless coward, and freedom will be defended” 
adding “the United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for 
these cowardly acts.”23 One might question what sort of freedom needed 
defending. If by freedom Bush meant more democracy and societal 
openness for allies in the Middle East, his actions thereafter—arguably—
did not support this. The sort of freedom Bush meant was ensuring the 
uninterrupted oil trade in the Persian Gulf; this is a more plausible 
justification given American actions in the region post-9/11. Alternatively, 
perhaps rather than a veiled cover for an underlying intent, he simply—
and superficially—meant the United States served as the world’s beacon of 
freedom and was not intimidated into submission. Regardless of meaning, 
do not blame Bush per se for such realpolitik. The British had purposefully 
foisted the problem of maintaining Middle East security on the FDR 
administration, sowing the seeds for deeper Persian Gulf commitment by 
each successive administration and thus, arguably, necessitating Bush’s 
immediate post-attack rhetoric.24 
 
In 1943, after several years of vigorous British politicking, FDR 
proclaimed, “I find the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the 
United States.”25 Towards the end of Second World War, FDR further 
acknowledged this need for oil and security in the region (to include the 
eventual creation of a Jewish state) when he met the Saudi king on his ship 
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at Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal.26 Shortly thereafter, Truman felt 
compelled to push the creation of the Israeli state—despite allied Arab 
state objections—under the pretense of securing domestic support from 
Jewish-Americans.27 Witnessing the decision making process on Israel and 
Palestine from within the administration, Secretary of State George C. 
Marshall remarked, “an effective solution would probably please neither 
the Arab nor Israel governments.”28 Marshall was right then, and still is 
today. 
 
When the Eisenhower administration had to choose between close NATO 
allies—UK and France—and Egypt during the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower 
sided with the latter for two reasons. Eisenhower despised European 
colonialism and the Suez Canal carried 1.5 million barrels of oil daily.29 
While his decision temporarily soured American relations with the UK and 
France, not to mention Israel, it did cease the prospect of significant 
European meddling in the region.30 Better or for worse, the future of 
Middle Eastern security deepened American entanglement in the region.  
 
After Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy formalized security ties with Israel, to 
which the State Department protested that this “special relationship in 
national security matters…would destroy the delicate balance we seek to 
maintain” in Middle Eastern relations.31 The Lyndon B. Johnson 
administration further cemented this relationship with Israel during the 
Arab-Israeli War and after.32 Unfortunately, this American-Israeli military 
alliance is now a fundamental component in vilifying the United States in 
Islamic extremist propaganda.33 The appearance of unrelenting American 
support to Israel merely feeds terrorist grievances and recruiting.34 
 
Richard Nixon’s time in office showed the limits of Israeli support in the 
face of oil costs, as Dr. Henry Kissinger engaged in shuttle diplomacy, 
reducing tensions and adding a modicum of delicate stability to the Middle 
Eastern region.35 At the same time though, Nixon saw the damage that oil 
fluctuations had on the American economy, and forewarned the possibility 
of an “American military intervention to protect vital oil supplies.”36 
Gerald Ford followed up the Nixon-Kissinger stability pact by essentially 
engaging in security clientelism with Israel and moderate Arab states. The 
United States committed billions of dollars annually to these countries for 
the purposes of “their survival against extremist pressures” internally and 
externally.37 The Ford administration essentially bought off the Middle 
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East region in hopes of a long-term economic play that would prevent 
another disruptive oil shock. This monetary commitment set up the 
Jimmy Carter administration to not only formally commit the United 
States to defend the region militarily, but such beliefs translated into an 
increased bureaucratic focus on the Persian Gulf and engagement in the 
domestic affairs of neighboring powers.38 Within two years of his 
proclamation, the U.S. military deployed to the Sinai for peacekeeping. 
Task Force Sinai remains there to this day and has been the focus of 
numerous attacks by local radical Islamist militias since 2015.39 
 
Ronald Reagan bore the brunt of the decisions made by previous 
administrations when he took command in the early 1980s, as anti-
American sentiment grew in the region. This era exhibited the beginnings 
of anti-American Islamic terrorism, due to perceptions of unfair American 
support for Israel. Reagan bungled numerous decisions in the Middle East, 
including the ill-fated deployment of U.S. Marines to Lebanon for 
peacekeeping (over 200 American troops were killed), funding and 
supporting Mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan, selling weapons to Iran 
(the so-called Iran-Contra Affair), and complicity supporting Iraq’s use of 
chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War.40 The Iran-Iraq war later 
expanded into attacks against ships carrying oil in the Gulf, known as the 
Tanker War. The Reagan decade ended with the George H.W. Bush 
administration militarily responding to Iraq’s inadvertent challenge to the 
Carter doctrine. 
 
Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to secure the Rumaila oil fields, and 
the looming threat of Saddam Hussein pushing into Saudi Arabia to seize 
more oil fields, Bush responded with massive military force in conjunction 
with a broad international coalition of 39 nations.41 The logic went that 
stability was preferred to regime change as the Bush administration and 
his coalition saw no reason to remove Saddam Hussein. Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney prophetically declared in 1991: 
 
If you're going to go in and try to topple Saddam 
Hussein, you have to go to Baghdad. Once you've got 
Baghdad, it's not clear what you do with it. It's not 
clear what kind of government you would put in place 
of the one that's currently there now. Is it going to be 
a Shia regime, a Sunni regime or a Kurdish regime?42 
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Ironically, in 2003 the George W. Bush administration forgot Cheney’s 
logical advice. After the Persian Gulf War, Hussein remained in charge of 
Iraq, serving as a counterbalance to Iranian power, while Operation 
Northern Watch and Southern Watch kept him boxed in. Such long-term 
military commitments led to the permanent stationing of significant U.S. 
military assets in the region, all in the name of preventing future Iraqi 
aggression while ensuring the free flow of oil. Thus, the U.S. military found 
itself gradually developing large military bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman. 
 
William J. Clinton inherited the post-Persian Gulf War security 
framework, with a large contingent of American troops permanently 
assigned to the region, ebbing and flowing between 5,000 to 25,000 
troops with an annual cost of $12 billion.43 At the same time, Clinton tried 
to forge a peaceful resolution between Israel and Palestine, while Bin 
Laden responded to the American presence in the Persian Gulf by 
attacking the United States and her interests.44 As George W. Bush was 
inaugurated in 2001, top officials in U.S. security and intelligence agencies 
were making the case for an escalation in anti-terror operations and 
preparation because of the numerous indicators showing spectacular 
attacks against the United States were imminent, yet they were ignored as 
just another threat.45 Shortly thereafter, the Bush administration, in 
response to the attacks of 9/11, would embolden the American foreign 
policy machinery to believe it could—without consequence—aggressively 
eliminate any authoritarian leader in the Middle East that did not play by 
the Washington playbook. 
 
Means: “I encourage you all to go shopping” 
 
Fighting a Global War on Terror requires a different kind of sacrifice not 
seen in previous American conflicts. It means convincing the public to 
forego its care and concern for a war over there, and instead worry about 
economic issues while an all-volunteer force engages in worldwide 
counterterrorism operations. During the Persian Gulf War, the American 
public noticed the impact of war mobilization as a total of 697,000 U.S. 
troops served during the short conflict, with a notable contingent of Guard 
and Reserve forces called up.46 These actions were in sharp contrast to the 
Vietnam War, where the United States used the Reserves for symbolic 
Burke and Matisek: The Illogical Logic of American Entanglement in the Middle East
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
10 
 
reasons—such as the response to the Pueblo incident and the Tet 
Offensive.47 The wars in Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq (2003-
present) have put significant strain on the American military, as almost 
half of all forces deployed come from Guard and Reserve units, which is a 
large divergence from the minimal level of mobilization during the Persian 
Gulf War and the almost absent use of such forces during the Vietnam 
War.48 
 
In the midst of the Iraqi Civil War of 2006, George W. Bush held a press 
conference concerning the economy, the war in Iraq, and on terror. Bush 
mentioned:  
 
The unemployment rate has remained low at 4.5 
percent. The recent report on retail sales shows a 
strong beginning to the holiday shopping season 
across the country. And I encourage you all to go 
shopping more.49 
 
In that press conference, he mentioned Iraq 53 times, terror 7 times, and 
the economy 13 times. He did not mention Afghanistan once. While not 
indicative of a myopic view of the perpetual war against terrorism, it does 
cynically represent that the shopping more attitude mattered more than 
dealing with the complex issue of Afghanistan. Worse yet, the civil war in 
Afghanistan that year had been the deadliest ever due to a resurgent 
Taliban.50 
 
Many saw the American invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 as the 
easiest and cheapest way to topple the regime. American Special Forces 
and CIA operatives linked up with friendly warlords throughout 
Afghanistan and gathered intelligence on Taliban activities to inform 
subsequent conventional operations. Shortly thereafter in November 2001, 
about 1,000 Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit under the 
command of (then) Brigadier General James Mattis became the first 
conventional forces in Afghanistan. After a successful 75th Ranger 
Regiment operation to establish a forward operating base in southwest 
Afghanistan known as Camp Rhino, the Marines assumed control of the 
base. Camp Rhino was the first United States base established in 
Afghanistan and served as the foundation for the entire ground war to 
follow. From Camp Rhino, the Marines seized Kandahar International 
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Airport—which then became the first U.S. air base in the country. This 
enabled the introduction of follow-on forces to support the rapidly 
expanding ground effort. Within three months of the initial deployment, 
about 1,300 troops from the United States and U.K., in conjunction with 
American airpower, dismantled the Taliban regime and pushed them out 
of the major cities and into the uncontrolled AfPak foothills.51 The 
problem with this military victory was that it was incomplete, as much of 
the Taliban leadership escaped into Pakistan. Thus, the Taliban escape 
resulted in a hollow American military victory that failed to achieve any 
broader strategic objectives; a political victory in Afghanistan remains 
elusive to this day. 
 
The experience of a quick victory on the cheap would provide evidence to 
some in the Bush administration that modern wars could now be won 
through limited numbers of troops.52 High-tech equipment and airpower 
in the hands of a small number of Special Forces appeared incredibly 
decisive, leading many to believe this Afghan Model to be a plausible 
alternative to the sort of expensive conventional air-land campaign waged 
in the Persian Gulf War.53 Still, the perception that conventional troops 
and technology wins wars pervades much of the foreign policy elite circles 
in the Washington Beltway, much as it had during the Vietnam War.54 
 
With the invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, the initial force of 130,000 
U.S. troops and 30,000 other coalition troops quickly routed formal Iraqi 
security forces within 21 days.55 Almost immediately, Iraqi generals with 
numerous floppy disks in hand (files containing the names and 
information of about 125,000 reliable Iraqi troops) met with American 
Generals and officials to set-up a transitory security force that could be 
trusted in a post-Saddam Iraq.56 The Iraqi military leadership had hoped 
that the Americans would be amicable to Iraqis taking care of their own 
safety and security almost immediately. However, Paul Bremer, the acting 
Chief Executive Authority for Iraq enacted a harsh de-Baathification 
program, which immediately left half a million angry personnel from the 
military and civil service unemployed.57 This was an environment ripe for 
insurgency: Hundreds of thousands of young men with military experience 
were jobless, hopeless, and under occupation. While there is speculation 
that Bremer was compelled to make the decision by those within the Bush 
inner circle, a prominent Iraqi Shia cleric (Ayatollah Sistani) exerted 
significant pressure on Bremer to disband Iraq’s military.58 In this case, 
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Shia leaders were concerned that Iraq would become a de facto Sunni 
military regime. 
 
The initial military victories of Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in numerous 
ideological missteps, and conditions quickly worsened in both countries. 
For example, about 5,500 American troops occupied Afghanistan in 2002, 
but by the end of 2003, that number had doubled.59 Not surprisingly, an 
internal memo from Richard Haass in 2002 identified the success of the 
United States in Afghanistan, and that it could be a good model on how to 
guide reconstruction in Iraq.60 Similarly, 67,700 troops occupied Iraq in 
2003; however, the loss of stability led to American troop levels doubling 
by the end of 2004. At the peak of U.S. military occupations, Afghanistan 
had about 63,500 troops in 2012, and Iraq had about 187,000 troops in 
2008.61 In both cases, American political leaders had hoped for too much 
with a limited amount of resources committed, ignoring the lack of 
institutional capacity in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
While security and governance issues plagued both countries during 
American occupation, Afghanistan had been a failed state for decades if 
not centuries, while Iraq fell apart due to the mismanagement of the 
country after the war.62 Such mismanagement by American and Iraqi 
government officials inadvertently created the Islamic State. Iraqi Prime 
Minister, Nouri al-Maliki followed the withdrawal of American troops in 
2011 by personalizing the army and politicizing other security forces.63 
This alienated many of the Sunnis in western Iraq, leading to the rise of 
the Islamic State, which required the U.S. military to redeploy to Iraq in 
2014 to protect Baghdad. Interestingly, the 70,000 Sunni insurgents paid 
off (during the Anbar Awakening of 2006) to not fight the U.S. military 
during The Surge of 2007, eventually found employment with the Islamic 
State due to Maliki trying to isolate them from power when the Americans 
left.64 Afghanistan is no better: some Afghan security commanders rent 
their equipment and loan their personnel to the Taliban.65 Despite such 
American entanglement, it is difficult for the U.S. leaders to force political 
leadership in these weak states to choose policies that contribute to long-
term stability. Worse, the United States continues providing substantial 
military aid to Iraq and Afghan security forces, creating nothing more than 
Fabergé Egg armies: Expensive but easily broken by insurgents.66 
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Expectations: “We're not winning; we're not losing” 
 
There is a serious issue when American leadership believes it can fight a 
war on the cheap. Such expectations are due to a mixture of politics and 
ideology. The George W. Bush administration made decisions on the 
number of military deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq based on avoiding 
domestic economic impacts. Troop levels perceived as too high would have 
made his administration and the Republican Party politically vulnerable to 
the cost of the wars, measured in both blood and treasure. Sadly, 
Afghanistan and Iraq required more resources and a strategic timeline 
longer than the foreign policy machinery wanted to admit. Consider how 
well American post-Second World War occupation worked in Japan, Italy, 
and Germany, or the sizeable contingent of American troops that have 
remained in South Korea since the Korean War. Proper post-conflict 
occupations may not be as ostentatious as combat operations, but they do 
require significant long-term political commitments, which can be a 
difficult pill to swallow for a domestic audience. To this day large and 
consistent troop contingents remain stationed in Germany, Italy, Japan, 
and Korea. American commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq, by 
comparison, have ebbed and flowed without supporting a reasonable end-
state of long-term stability in each country. Despite persistent strategic 
ambiguity, it appears increasingly evident that the leaders of these 
countries know that the United States and international community will 
subsidize further mismanagement of their nations. 
 
After five years of combat operations in Afghanistan and three years in 
Iraq, George W. Bush came to terms with his strategic struggles. Bush 
admitted in 2006 “we're not winning, we're not losing,” adding “we need 
to reset our military” in response to claims that it was stressed. Bush also 
noted, “we're going to need a military that's capable of being able to 
sustain our efforts and to help us achieve peace” in the fight against 
Islamic extremists.67 Bush finally made such comments despite numerous 
warnings from politicians and officials that there were not enough troops 
or resources dedicated to stabilizing both countries.68 At the same time, 
the Bush response in both countries was already too little, too late, a 
similar sentiment echoed at the end of the Vietnam War.69 
 
The lackluster concern for fielding enough troops for Afghanistan and Iraq 
was built on the perception and premise that these wars needed to 
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minimize impact on the American way of life and economy, which 
struggled in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Additionally, for ideological 
reasons, George W. Bush was committed to his tax cut promise for two 
reasons—even when the economy began flailing. First, a 2001 Heritage 
Foundation report supported the Bush tax cuts because it was believed 
that this would lead to increased tax revenue generation; eliminating the 
national debt by 2010.70 This was ideologically misguided unfortunately, 
as the U.S. national debt reached $14 trillion by the end of 2010.71 Second, 
Bush was heavily influenced by his father’s experience with tax policy. 
George H.W. Bush reneged on the “read-my-lips, no-new-taxes” promise 
in 1990, as he pragmatically chose to balance the budget.72 Many, and 
George W. Bush especially, saw this decision as a critical mistake, leading 
to his father’s failed re-election bid.73 Thus, George W. Bush attempted to 
juggle the economy and a war on terror, while making reelection a top 
priority.  
 
When it came to proposing funding for the 2003 Iraq War, the Bush 
administration estimated it would cost a mere $50-60 billion, with 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld predicting a need for no more than 
145,000 troops for the invasion and post-stability operations.74 Yet the 
Army Chief of Staff, General Shinseki, pushed back against those 
estimates. Shinseki told Congress that any coalition would need “several 
hundred thousand soldiers” to control the security situation after the 
defeat of Iraqi forces.75 The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, 
would later reprimand Shinseki for going against Pentagon estimates 
pushed by Bush administration appointees. Instead, Wolfowitz proclaimed 
that Iraq war cost estimates ranged from $10 billion to $100 billion and 
that the effort required approximately 100,000 troops.76 Bush even fired 
his economic adviser, Lawrence Lindsey, for suggesting that the Iraq War 
might cost as much as $200 billion.77 Compare such initial estimates to the 
cruel fact that the war in Iraq cost $1.7 trillion.78 This figure continues to 
grow in light of the American commitment to fight the Islamic State, and 
the medical costs of long-term care for troops injured fighting in Iraq. 
Thus, this internal politicking within the Bush administration indicates 
that they likely worried more about avoiding disruptions to U.S. society 
and its economy than truly trying to win each war with enough resources 
that many experts had suggested. 
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The rapid initial victories in Afghanistan and Iraq also led many military 
and political leaders to believe that a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
had occurred; enabling the U.S. military to technologically overcome any 
enemy with minimal amounts of troops.79 The foreign policy bureaucracy 
preferred RMA due to its low-risk warfare approach, such as airpower and 
Special Forces, juxtaposed to riskier—from a public relations perspective—
use of boots on the ground to fight Iraqi and Afghan insurgents. Such a 
belief in technological superiority leading to victory has been woven in the 
fabric of the war-making bureaucracy since at least the Vietnam War.  
 
Bernard Fall first astutely identified this American form of warfighting in 
1961 in Street without Joy. Commenting on United States and French 
involvement in French Indochina, Fall stated, “The West is still battling an 
ideology with technology.”80 He added that the Americans, much like their 
French predecessors, over-relied on their technological advantage to avoid 
addressing “the woeful lack of popular support and political savvy” 
involved with propping up an unpopular South Vietnamese government.81 
Such over-dependence on technology means that killing the enemy 
becomes the primary metric for success, because it is difficult to quantify 
military impact on an insurgency, let alone kill it. Winning in this 
subjective arena is much more difficult for a military with shortened time 
horizons. Westernized militaries are not designed to mend the sort of 
political solutions required in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, the idea 
that superior technology and firepower wins wars is a fallacy propagated 
by defense hawks and weapons contractors who are often ignorant to 
military engagements of the past.  
 
Steven Biddle’s award-winning 2004 book Military Power shows us that 
force employment—or the “doctrine and tactics by which forces are 
actually used in combat”—is a better and more reliable determinant of 
combat success or failure relative to technology, materiel, and gross 
numerical strength.82 Yet, despite this modern account of how militaries 
are actually employed in combat, the United States still overestimates its 
advantage, underestimates its enemies, and entrenches itself in sustained 
conflicts with seemingly no clearly defined and achievable end-state. 
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A Way Forward? 
 
The adventurous military campaigns and entanglement in the greater 
Middle East region have imposed significant economic and human costs. 
At the expense of American education, infrastructure, and energy security, 
the Americans directed an overwhelming amount of resources and mental 
effort towards the region over almost two decades with little to show for it. 
It is less stable and no freer. Current estimates put the total cost of these 
wars in the greater Middle East region at $4.7 trillion and climbing.83 Such 
pursuits have all been charged to the American credit card.84 The irony 
inherent in these costly pursuits of stability and energy security in the 
Middle East is that such funds could have been better spent on 
contributing to the United States pursuit of domestic energy 
independence, thus lessening energy dependence on the Persian Gulf.85 
 
Perhaps it is fitting that during Barack Obama’s tenure, when given the 
choice between massive escalation and disengagement, he chose a third 
rail: Forcing Middle Eastern countries to resolve their own problems with 
minimal American assistance. When pressure on his administration 
compelled Obama to keep U.S. combat troops in Iraq after 2011, he 
decided against keeping a sizeable military contingent due to the Iraqi 
parliament denying immunity in the new Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) in a post-2011 Iraq.86 Such a decision by the Iraqi government 
hamstrung Obama, especially since George W. Bush had penned the 2008 
SOFA treaty promising to remove American troops at the end of 2011.87 
Had Obama kept forces after 2011, American troops could have faced 
prosecution for possible crimes in Iraqi courts, a judicial system that 
Human Rights Watch called a “broken justice system.”88 While some 
could criticize Obama for not doing enough to convince Iraq to allow a 
residual American force to remain after 2011 with SOFA immunity, the 
Iraqi government can be the face of more criticism for marginalizing 
Sunnis after 2011, which ignited the Islamic State movement in 
conjunction with a failing Syrian state.89 
 
Obama’s announcement about the symbolic end to the war on terror in 
2013 was indicative of his desire to decouple the U.S. military from the 
problems of the greater Middle East region.90 This change, however, for 
the foreign policy machinery is the equivalent of trying to move 
mountains. Practically nothing changed after 2013, and as the Islamic 
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State came to power, it required a return by the United States to impose 
security. Indeed, the gambler’s fallacy even plays in strongly, as the United 
States has invested immense resources in creating a network of substantial 
military bases throughout the region, and creating a complex web of 
foreign military relationships. Worse yet, American politicians overplay 
and overhype threats from the region to stoke their political base and be 
elected. 
 
Yet against all odds, as indicated in Jeff Goldberg’s The Atlantic piece on 
the “The Obama Doctrine,” Obama no longer perceived the Middle East as 
important to future American interests. He cynically concluded that 
American military power had little chance of making the region better or 
more stable. Similarly, Obama questioned why the United States should 
subsidize the military advantage held by the Israeli military. He also 
addressed the role of Sunni regimes inciting anti-American sentiments.91 
Conceivably, it is no surprise that Obama hesitantly and timidly deployed 
military force in Libya, and still saw some of his fears come true, leading to 
greater trepidation in how to employ military force in the Syrian civil war. 
 
Perhaps the foreign policy bureaucracy was threatened by Obama’s macro-
level and longitudinal understanding of the cultural and structural 
changes that are constraining the Middle East. Obama reluctantly 
concluded that hard military power alone could not solve such problems. 
Only time will tell if the legacy of Obama will be, per his critics, that “he is 
not a realist, but an isolationist with drones and special-operations 
forces.”92 
 
Nevertheless, Obama’s attempt to steer away from the greater Middle East 
region will be the lasting memory of his foreign policy legacy; attempting 
to dig America out of the British inspired rabbit hole dug for FDR and 
successive presidents. With over three years in office, President Donald J. 
Trump seems to have returned to a pre-Obama Middle East policy, which 
aligns closely with the Pentagon’s institutional preference for a 
securitization of problems. The Trump administration wants to increase 
defense spending substantially while significantly cutting the State 
Department budget.93 This will upgrade the hammer of American power to 
a golden plated sledgehammer. 
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Obama’s attempts to reduce commitments to the region will likely be a 
speed bump when viewed from the longue durée by historians. Critics saw 
Trump’s deployment of Marines to Syria as the latest escalation in an 
untenable and unwinnable situation lacking a solution and exit strategy. 
The introduction of conventional ground forces into Syrian territory—
according to media pundits—indicated a return to pre-Obama policies.94 
Yet in the latest irony of ironies, Trump’s announcement December 2018 
to withdraw about 2,000 U.S. troops from Syria is seen by the same critics 
as uninformed and apathetic to the potential destabilizing effects it may 
bring to the country and region.95 Defense Secretary James Mattis 
resigned his post over misaligned views with President Trump on the 
United States approach to allies, malign actors, and strategic competitors. 
Mattis’ resignation generated discourse that further supports the central 
claim to this article: The inertia and momentum of war is too great to stop. 
This takes us back to the Trump administration that again reversed course 
in August 2019 committing U.S. troops to the creation of a Syrian safe 
zone with the Turkish military.96 
 
After almost two decades of sustained American combat operations in the 
Middle East, one might rightly think the announcement of troop 
withdrawal from Syria would be welcomed—even refreshing—news in the 
public narrative. Despite this, the conscious and subconscious military-
industrial complex has fired back with criticism of the move. There is 
resistance to withdrawal in the military and Congressional circles. The 
inertia of war continues today as it did during Vietnam, informed and 
influenced by longstanding policies, traditions, and precedent. To this end, 
the appointment of ideological war hawks, such as John Bolton as the 
National Security Advisor, reinforce this trend back towards the status quo 
of believing that American military power can simply conduct regime 
changes effortlessly.97 Moreover, it suggests that states might be more 
broadly labeled as terrorists, such as Iran, possibly leading to a military 
confrontation with Iran for its support of various Shia militias, such as the 
Houthi rebels in Yemen, and other groups in the Middle East and Africa.98 
 
Conclusion  
 
If history is doomed to repeat itself with the way America once supported 
notable insurgents, such as Ho Chi Minh and Bin Laden, then there is no 
doubt that some of these American backed rebels in Syria and Iraq will be 
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future nemeses in 20 years. The only reasonable question left is how much 
will the DOD continue the securitization of the greater Middle East region 
without a strategy resembling the Marshall Plan? 
 
Under the Trump administration, the Middle East system appears 
successful for the time being. The bad guys are familiar to the good guys, 
and the apparatuses are in place to fight them. The political constituency 
in the United States is ostensibly happy that the gloves are off in the fight 
against the Islamic State and similar armed groups. The Trump 
administration appears to have given the U.S. military more autonomy in 
conducting its wars than any other president in recent history.99 The oil 
continues to flow, and gasoline prices remain reasonable and stable in the 
United States However, this all comes at the expense of a rise in national 
debt as taxes are cut, and hundreds of billions are borrowed from other 
countries (such as China) to maintain an over-sized military that permits a 
foreign policy to operate with short-time horizons. Strategy, instead of the 
potential change to consider a bigger picture as intended by Obama, 
instead reverts to the past 70-year repetitive cycle of what seems to work. 
The only question is will this symbolic strategy against terrorism in the 
Middle East eventually succeed? Alternatively, will the ghost of Vietnam 
and its failed strategy haunt the United States for decades to come? 
Burke and Matisek: The Illogical Logic of American Entanglement in the Middle East
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
20 
 
Endnotes 
1 Leslie H. Gelb, “Vietnam: The System Worked,” Foreign Policy, no. 3 (1971): 140-67, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1147838. 
2 Killian McCormack, “Governing ‘ungoverned’ Space: Humanitarianism, Citizenship, and 
the Civilian Sphere in the Territorialising Practices of the US National Security Complex,” 
Critical Military Studies 4, no. 2 (2018): 161-180, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2017.1371375. 
3 Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001 [1979]). 
4 Andrew J. Bacevich, America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History 
(New York: Random House, 2016). 
5 Amaney A. Jamal, Of Empires and Citizens: Pro-American Democracy or no 
Democracy at All? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
6 Tim Arango and Helene Cooper, “U.S. Investigating Mosul Strikes said to Have Killed 
up to 200 Civilians,” The New York Times, March 24, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/world/middleeast/us-iraq-mosul-investigation-
airstrike-civilian-deaths.html. 
7 Rick Noack, “U.S. Allies reject Trump’s Jerusalem Pronouncement as ‘Very dangerous’ 
and ‘Catastrophic’,” The Washington Post, December 7, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/12/06/its-catastrophic-u-
s-allies-reject-trumps-expected-jerusalem-pronouncement. 
8 Jahara Matisek and Ian Bertram, “The Death of American Conventional Warfare: It’s 
the Political Willpower, Stupid,” The Strategy Bridge, November 5, 2017, 
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/5/the-death-of-american-
conventional-warfare-its-the-political-willpower-stupid. 
9 H. L. Goodall, “Twice Betrayed by the Truth: A Narrative about the Cultural Similarities 
between the Cold War and the Global War on Terror,” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical 
Methodologies (CSCM) 8, no. 3 (2008): 353-368, 
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1532708607310796. 
10 “Congressional Budget Justification: Fiscal Year 2016,” United States Department of 
State, February 2, 2015, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236395.pdf; 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Chief Financial Officer, 
Operation & Maintenance Overview: Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Estimates,” February 2015, 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_Budg
et_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. 
11 George W. Bush, The Global War on Terrorism – The First 100 Days (Washington, DC: 
The Coalition Information Centers, 2001); Scott Wilson and Al Kamen, “'Global War On 
Terror' is given New Name,” The Washington Post, March 25, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html; Jack Moore, “Trump 
Administration says War on Terror began before 9/11 with Hezbollah attack on U.S. 
troops,” Newsweek, October 24, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/trump-
administration-says-war-terror-began-911-hezbollah-attack-us-troops-691653. 
12 Paul Pillar, “The heavy historical baggage of U.S. policy toward the Middle East,” The 
National Interest, July 8, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/the-heavy-
historical-baggage-us-policy-toward-the-middle-13286. 
13 Malcolm Byrne, “CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup,” National Security Archive 
Electronic Briefing Book No 435 (2013): 19; Saeed Kamali Dehghan, and Richard 
Norton-Taylor, “CIA Admits Role in 1953 Iranian Coup,” The Guardian, August 19, 2013, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup. 
14 Robert Lifset, American Energy Policy in the 1970s (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2014), 171. 
 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss1/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1771
21 
 
 
15 Jimmy Carter, “The State of the Union Address Delivered before a Joint Session of the 
Congress, January 23, 1980,” The American Presidency Project, 1980, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079. 
16 Turkey and Israel remained in U.S. European Command (EUCOM) due to political 
sensitivities. 
17 CNN Wire Staff, “Timeline: Osama bin Laden, over the years,” CNN, May 2, 2011, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/05/02/bin.laden.timeline/; Peter L. Hahn, 
Crisis and crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Washington, DC: 
Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), 117. 
18 Christopher M. Davidson, Shadow Wars: The Secret Struggle for the Middle East 
(London: Oneworld Publications, 2016). 
19 John Williamson, “Short History of the Washington Consensus” in The Washington 
Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance, eds. Narcis Serra and 
Joseph E. Stiglitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 14-30. 
20 This also includes advice and assist missions that usually performed by Special Forces. 
21 Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (New 
York: Macmillan, 2008). 
22 Freedom House, Freedom in the Middle East and North Africa: A Freedom in the 
World (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). 
23 George W. Bush, “Bush: ‘Freedom Will Be Defended’,” Los Angeles Times, September 
12, 2001, http://articles.latimes.com/2001/sep/11/news/ss-44622. 
24 Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East 1941-1947: The Road to the Cold 
War (New York: Routledge, 2013), 37-39. 
25 G. Jefferson Price, “Saudis remember FDR’s Broken Promise,” The Baltimore Sun, 
September 1, 2002, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2002-09-
01/topic/0208310033_1_saudi-arabia-ibn-saud-king-of-saudi. 
26 Adam Taylor, “The First Time a U.S. President Met a Saudi King,” The Washington 
Post, January 27, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/01/27/the-first-time-a-u-
s-president-met-a-saudi-king/. 
27 “Harry S. Truman: Foreign Affairs,” Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of 
Virginia, 2016, http://millercenter.org/president/biography/truman-foreign-affairs. 
28 Michael Joseph Cohen, Truman and Israel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1990), 243. 
29 Michael H. Coles, “Suez, 1956: A Successful Naval Operation Compromised by Inept 
Political Leadership,” Naval War College Review 59, no. 4 (2006): 100-118, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26396772; Cole Christian Kingseed, Eisenhower and the 
Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1995); Rose McDermott, Risk-taking in 
International politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2001), 135-164. 
30 The Economist, “The Suez Crisis. An Affair to Remember,” The Economist, July 27, 
2006, http://www.economist.com/node/7218678. 
31 “Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-
1963, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v17/d290. 
32 “Milestones: 1961-1968,” State Department, Office of the Historian, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/arab-israeli-war-1967. 
33 Scott Gerwehr and Sara Daly, Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment 
(Arlington, VA: RAND, 2006). 
34 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: 
Random House, 2005). 
35 “Richard Nixon: Foreign Affairs,” Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 
2016, http://millercenter.org/president/biography/nixon-foreign-affairs. 
36 Jerry Robinson, Bankruptcy of Our Nation (Revised and Expanded): Your Financial 
Survival Guide (New York: New Leaf Publishing Group, 2012), 80. 
Burke and Matisek: The Illogical Logic of American Entanglement in the Middle East
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
22 
 
 
37 Gerald R. Ford, “Foreign Relations,” Ford Library Museum, February 18, 1976, 
https://fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/factbook/foreign.htm. 
38 Charles Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
39 W.J. Hennigan, “U.S. Shifts Troops in the Sinai Peninsula After Attacks by Militants,” 
Los Angeles Times, April 23, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-us-
sinai-20160423-story.html. 
40 Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. “Ronald Reagan: Foreign 
Affairs,” 2016, http://millercenter.org/president/biography/reagan-foreign-affairs; 
William Lowther, “Rumsfeld 'Helped Iraq get Chemical Weapons,'” Daily Mail, 
September 4, 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-153210/Rumsfeld-helped-
Iraq-chemical-weapons.html. 
41 Thomas C Hayes, “Confrontation in the Gulf; The Oilfield Lying below the Iraq-Kuwait 
Dispute,” The New York Times, September 3, 1990, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/03/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-the-oilfield-
lying-below-the-iraq-kuwait-dispute.html; William P. Head, Night Hunters: The AC-130s 
and Their Role in US Airpower (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2014). 
42 Adrian R. Lewis, The American Culture of War: A History of US Military Force from 
World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom (New York: Routledge, 2014), 359. 
43 W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region 
(New York: Springer, 2008); John A. Tirpak, “Legacy of the Air Blockades,” Air Force 
Magazine 86, no. 2 (2003): 46-53, 
https://www.airforcemag.com/PDF/MagazineArchive/Documents/2003/February%202
003/02legacy03.pdf. 
44 Frontline “Oslo Accord,” PBS, September 13, 1993, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/oslo/negotiations/; Byron York, “The 
Facts about Clinton and Terrorism,” National Review, September 11, 2006, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/218683/. 
45 Chris Whipple, “What the CIA Knew Before 9/11: New Details,” Politico, November 13, 
2015, https://www.politico.eu/article/attacks-will-be-spectacular-cia-war-on-terror-
bush-bin-laden/. 
46 James Ciment, Postwar America: An Encyclopedia of Social, Political, Cultural, and 
Economic History (New York: Routledge, 2015), 630; Stephen M. Duncan, “Gulf War was 
a Test of Reserve Components and They Passed,” The United States Naval War College, 
(June 1991), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/research/p162.pdf 
47 David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, “US Military's Reliance on the Reserves,” 
Population Reference Bureau, March 2005, 
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2005/USMilitarysRelianceontheReserves.asp
x. 
48 Richard J. Dunn III, “America’s Reserve and National Guard Components,” 2016 Index 
of U.S. Military Strength, The Heritage Foundation, 2016, 
http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/essays/americas-reserve-and-national-guard-
components/. 
49 George W. Bush, “President Bush’s News Conference,” The New York Times, December 
20, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/20/washington/20text-bush.html. 
50 Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban resurgence in 
Afghanistan,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 5, no. 2 (2007): 93-129, 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a484262.pdf. 
51 Barzilai Yaniv, “How Bin Laden escaped in 2001 – The Lessons of Tora Bora,” The 
Daily Beast, December 15, 2013, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/15/how-bin-laden-escaped-in-2001-
the-lessons-of-tora-bora.html; CBS News Politics, “The War in Afghanistan: A Timeline,” 
CBS News, December 1, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-war-in-afghanistan-
a-timeline/. 
52 Doug Stanton, 12 Strong: The Declassified True Story of the Horse Soldiers (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 2017). 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss1/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1771
23 
 
 
53 Stephen D. Biddle, “Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.” International Security 30, no. 3 (2006): 161–176, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.161. 
54 Patrick Radden Keefe, “McMaster and Commander,” New Yorker, April 30, 2018, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/30/mcmaster-and-commander. 
55 CNN, “More U.S. Troops, Armor Head to Iraq,” CNN, March 28, 2003, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/27/sprj.irq.war.main/. 
56 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: 
Penguin, 2006). 
57 Andrew Arato, Constitution Making Under Occupation: The Politics of Imposed 
Revolution in Iraq (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Warren Vieth, “U.S. to 
Lay off 500,000 in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, June 3, 2003, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jun/03/world/fg-econ3. 
58 Fred Kaplan, “Who Disbanded the Iraqi Army?” Slate Magazine, September 7, 2007, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2007/09/who_disbande
d_the_iraqi_army.html; Chris Sibilla, “De-Baathification and Dismantling the Iraqi 
Army,” Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, January 2016, 
http://adst.org/2016/01/de-baathification-and-dismantling-the-iraqi-army/. 
59 Amy Belasco, “Troop levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and 
Other Potential Issues,” Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2009, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf. 
60 Richard N. Haass, “Reconstruction in Iraq-Lessons of the Past,” Information 
Memorandum to the Secretary of State, September 26, 2002, declassified and released 
by the U.S. Department of State, September 26, 2012. 
61 Belasco, Amy. “Troop levels in the Afghan and Iraq wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and 
other potential issues.” Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2009, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf. 
62 Roland Paris, and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting 
the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
63 Jahara Matisek and William Reno, “Getting American Security Force Assistance Right: 
Political Context Matters,” Joint Force Quarterly 92 (1st Quarter, 2019): 65-73, 
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-92/jfq-92_65-73_Matisek-
Reno.pdf. 
64 Guy Raz, “Military Officials Disagree on Impact of Surge,” National Public Radio, 
January 8, 2008, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17899543; 
William A. Knowlton Jr, The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2010). 
65 Jonathan Broder and Sami Yousafzai, “Arming the Enemy in Afghanistan,” Newsweek, 
May 18, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/2015/05/29/arming-enemy-afghanistan-
332840.html. 
66 Jahara Matisek, “The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and 
Fabergé Egg Armies,” Defense & Security Analysis 34, no. 3 (2018): 267-290, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2018.1500757. 
67 Peter Baker, “US Not Winning War in Iraq, Bush Says for 1st Time,” The Washington 
Post, December 20, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/12/19/AR2006121900880.html. 
68 Daniel P. Bolger, Why we Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan Wars (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014). 
69 Ambassador Robert Komer quoted in an interview on page 671 in: Paul Melshen, 
“Mapping out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan: Critical Considerations in 
Counterinsurgency Campaigning,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, no. 4 (2007): 665-
698; Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-
GVN Performance in Vietnam (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, August 1972). 
70 D. Mark Wilson and William W. Beach, The Economic Impact of President Bush's Tax 
Relief Plan (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2001), 
http://origin.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2001/04/The-Economic-Impact-of-
President-Bushs-Tax-Relief-Plan. 
Burke and Matisek: The Illogical Logic of American Entanglement in the Middle East
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
24 
 
 
71 Mark Knoller, “National Debt Tops $14 Trillion,” CBS News, January 4, 2011, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/national-debt-tops-14-trillion/. 
72 Elizabeth Barber, “George H.W. Bush Honored for Courage with 1990 Tax Hikes,” 
Reuters, May 4, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-kennedy-bush-
idUSBREA4308G20140505. 
73 Bryan Hilliard, Tom Lansford, and Robert P. Watson, eds., George W. Bush: 
Evaluating the President at Midterm. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2012). 
74 Seth Cline, “The Underestimated Costs, and Price Tag, of the Iraq War,” U.S. News & 
World Report, March 20, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/press-
past/2013/03/20/the-underestimated-costs-and-price-tag-of-the-iraq-war. 
75 Nicolaus Mills, “Punished for Telling Truth about Iraq War,” CNN, March 20, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/20/opinion/mills-truth-teller-iraq/. 
76 Eric Schmitt, “Threats and Responses: Military Spending; Pentagon Contradicts 
General on Iraq Occupation Force's Size,” The New York Times, February 28, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/28/us/threats-responses-military-spending-
pentagon-contradicts-general-iraq-occupation.html. 
77 James Fallows, “Paying the Costs of Iraq, for Decades to Come,” The Atlantic, May 29, 
2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/03/paying-the-costs-of-iraq-
for-decades-to-come/274477/. 
78 Daniel Trotta, “Iraq War Costs U.S. More than $2 Trillion: Study,” Reuters, March 14, 
2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-war-anniversary-
idUSBRE92D0PG20130314. 
79 RMA is highly contentious; however, several scholars initially suggested the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan illustrated the primacy of RMA in quickly defeating larger armies 
lacking the same technological capability in warfighting. Götz Neuneck, “The Revolution 
in Military Affairs: Its Driving Forces, Elements, and Complexity,” Complexity 14, no. 1 
(2008): 50-61, https://doi.org/10.1002/cplx.20236; Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, The 
Revolution in Military Affairs and the Boomerang Effect (Copenhagen: Danish Institute 
for International Studies, 2004); Gary Chapman, “An Introduction to the Revolution in 
Military Affairs,” in XV Amaldi Conference on Problems in Global Security, Helsinki, 
2003, http://www.raffaellotrionfodigalatea.it/rapporti/amaldi/papers/XV-
Chapman.pdf. 
80 Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina (New York: Pen 
and Sword, 2005), 7. 
81 Ibid., 368. 
82 Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
83 Neta C. Crawford, “US Budgetary Costs of Wars through 2016: $4.79 Trillion and 
Counting Summary of Costs of the US Wars in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan and 
Homeland Security,” Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown 
University, updated September 2016, 
http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2016/Costs%20of%20War
%20through%202016%20FINAL%20final%20v2.pdf. 
84 Joshua S. Goldstein, The Real Price of War: How you Pay for the War on Terror (New 
York: NYU Press, 2005). 
85 “For the Price of the Iraq War, The U.S. Could Have a 100% Renewable Power System,” 
WashingtonsBlog, April 11, 2013, http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/04/for-the-
price-of-the-iraq-war-the-u-s-could-have-a-100-renewable-power-system.html. 
86 James F. Jeffrey, “Behind the U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, 
November 2, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/james-franklin-jeffrey-behind-the-u-s-
withdrawal-from-iraq-1414972705. 
87Sahar Issa, Jenan Hussein, and Hussein Kadhim, “Unofficial Translation of US-Iraq 
Troop Agreement from the Arabic Text,” McClatchy Newspapers, November 18, 2008, 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24511081.html. 
88 Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: A Broken Justice System,” Human Rights Watch, January 
31, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/31/iraq-broken-justice-system. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss1/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1771
25 
 
 
89 Priyanka Boghani, “In Their Own Words: Sunnis on Their Treatment in Maliki’s Iraq,” 
Frontline: PBS, October 28, 2014, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/in-their-
own-words-sunnis-on-their-treatment-in-malikis-iraq/. 
90 Paul D. Shinkman, “Obama: 'Global War on Terror' Is Over,” U.S. News & World 
Report, March 23, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/05/23/obama-
global-war-on-terror-is-over. 
91 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/. 
92 Josef Joffe, “Obama is not a Realist,” The Atlantic, March 10, 2016, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/03/obama-doctrine-goldberg-
realist-isolationist/473205/. 
93 Dan Merica, “Trump's 'Hard Power Budget' increases Defense Spending, cuts to State 
Dept, EPA,” CNN, March 16, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/16/politics/donald-
trump-budget-blueprint/. 
94 Richard Sisk, “Mattis Gives White House Tentative Plan for Rapid Defeat of ISIS,” 
Military.com, February 28, 2017, http://www.military.com/daily-
news/2017/02/28/mattis-gives-white-house-tentative-plan-rapid-defeat-isis.html. 
95 Mark Landler, Helene Cooper, and Eric Schmitt, “Trump to Withdraw U.S. Forces from 
Syria, Declaring ‘We Have Won Against ISIS’,” The New York Times, December 19, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/politics/trump-syria-turkey-troop-
withdrawal.html. 
96 Sarah Dadouch, “Turkey, U.S. Agree to Form Joint Operation Center for Syria Safe 
Zone,” Reuters, August 7, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-
turkey/turkey-us-agree-to-form-joint-operation-center-for-syria-safe-zone-
idUSKCN1UX0Y9. 
97 Amanda Macias, “Here's Where John Bolton Stands on Iran Nuclear Deal, North Korea 
and Other National Security Matters,” CNBC, March 23, 2018, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/23/where-john-bolton-stands-on-iran-nuke-deal-
north-korea-russia.html. 
98 Emmanuel Karagiannis, “The Rise of Iran as a Regional Power: Shia Empowerment 
and its limits,” NATO Review, 2016, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-
2016/iran-tehran-islamic/EN/index.htm. 
99 Jahara Matisek, “American Civil-Military Relations since George Washington: Has 
Donald Trump Changed the Dynamic?” Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, 
Economics, Law 10, no. 3 (2017): 54-67, https://www.ogt-
journal.com/jour/article/download/20/19. 
Burke and Matisek: The Illogical Logic of American Entanglement in the Middle East
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
